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Abstract
This paper compares price-level-path targeting (PT) with inﬂation targeting (IT) in a sticky-price,
dynamic, general equilibrium model augmented with imperfections in both the debt and equity
markets. Using a Bayesian approach, we estimate this model for the Canadian economy. We show
that the model with both debt and equity market imperfections ﬁts the data better and use it to
compare PT versus the estimated current IT regime. We ﬁnd that in general PT outperforms the
current IT regime. However, the gain is lower when ﬁnancial market imperfections are taken into
account.
JEL classiﬁcation: E40, E50
Bank classiﬁcation: Monetary policy framework; Inﬂation targets; Economic models
Résumé
L’étude compare une règle comportant une cible de niveau des prix à une règle axée sur la
poursuite d’une cible d’inﬂation, dans le cadre d’un modèle dynamique d’équilibre général à prix
rigides qui intègre des marchés obligataire et boursier imparfaits. À l’aide d’une approche
bayésienne, les auteurs estiment ce modèle pour l’économie canadienne. Ils montrent qu’un
modèle qui présuppose la présence d’imperfections sur ces deux marchés décrit mieux les
données et se servent du modèle estimé pour comparer un régime ciblant le niveau des prix au
régime actuel de cibles d’inﬂation. De façon générale, le régime prenant pour cible le niveau des
prix s’avère supérieur au régime actuel, mais sa supériorité est moins marquée lorsque
l’imperfection des marchés ﬁnanciers est prise en compte.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E40, E50
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cadre de la politique monétaire; Cibles en matière d’inﬂation;
Modèles économiques1 Introduction
This paper studies the implications of ￿nancial market imperfections for the design
of monetary policy rules in a standard New Keynesian economy. Currently, Canada
follows an in￿ ation targeting (IT) rule, but there is much interest in the advantages and
disadvantages of moving to a price-level-path targeting (PT) regime. The conventional
wisdom (e.g., Duguay (1994)) about price-level targeting is that it o⁄ers lower long-
term variability in the price level at the cost of higher short-term variation in in￿ ation
and output. Recently, several papers have challenged this conventional view (Svensson
(1999),Vestin (2006)). In particular, Vestin (2006) shows that PT dominates IT when
agents are forward-looking. Under a PT regime these agents would set prices taking
into consideration that higher-than-expected in￿ ation will be followed by lower-than-
expected in￿ ation. Thus under this new view, PT can be a free lunch, that is, PT can
deliver both lower long-term and short-term variability in in￿ ation.
This paper compares these two regimes in a forward-looking model augmented with
￿nancial market imperfections in the presence of nominal debt contracts.1 First, we show
that in general PT can deliver lower long-run and short-run variability in in￿ ation. This
con￿rms the new view in the literature. Second, we compare PT versus IT based on a
loss function including both variability in in￿ ation and the output gap.2 We show that
stabilizing in￿ ation does not necessarily imply a stabilization of the output gap in the
presence of ￿nancial market frictions. Although PT outperforms the current IT regime
in general, the gain is lower when ￿nancial market imperfections are present. Output
gap throughout the paper refers to the deviation of output from the e¢ cient level which
would prevail in a ￿ exible-price economy.3 We use the deviation from the e¢ cient output
level rather than the steady-state level because in the presence of technology shocks, the
e¢ cient level of output varies. It is natural to allow the central bank to recognize this
fact when adjusting nominal interest rates.
Our model features sticky prices, money-in-the-utility function, investment adjust-
ment costs, ￿nancial market imperfections, and imperfect competition in the producers
of ￿nal goods. We expand the degree of ￿nancial market imperfections in Bernanke
et al. (1999). In particular, we assume: (1) entrepreneurs only have access to nominal
debt contracts,4 and (2) capital producers are ￿nanced with equity and subject to eq-
uity issuance costs. We expect that assuming one-period debt contracts to be written
in nominal terms will generate an additional distortion due to unanticipated changes
in the price level (debt-de￿ ation e⁄ect). Unexpected changes in the price level have an
impact on the real value of ￿rms￿liabilities and change the balance sheet conditions of
￿rms. This has an e⁄ect on the external ￿nance premium, and in turn, on the response
of the real economic activity to shocks (￿nancial accelerator mechanism). Meh et al.
1For business cycle models with ￿nancial market imperfections see, for example, Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), and Christiano et al. (2003).
2Throughout the paper, IT refers to the estimated current IT rule.
3See Woodford (2003) for detailed discussions on output gap.
4Christiano et al. (2003), Gilchrist and Saito (2006) , Christensen and Dib (2008) and Dib et al.
(2008) also make this assumption in a ￿nancial accelerator model.
2(2008) has shown that in the presence of nominal assets, a price-level shock can create
redistributions among agents and the extent of redistributions is di⁄erent under PT than
IT. However, their study has not taken into account di⁄erent sources of business cycle
￿ uctuations and ￿nancial market imperfections. The assumption that capital produc-
ers are ￿nanced with equity is motivated by the fact that ￿rms frequently issue equity
and that equity ￿nance does have an important role in ￿rm ￿nancing.5 We capture the
imperfections in the equity market by assuming capital producers face a friction in ob-
taining equity ￿nance. This friction is characterized by a quadratic function that relates
the cost of issuing equity to the amount of equity raised. We also assume that this cost
is countercyclical.
We estimate the main structural parameters of the model using Canadian time series.
Taking the estimates as the parameters in our benchmark case, we compare the estimated
IT with PT by performing stochastic simulations of the model. For the two extensions,
we ￿nd that having equity issuance costs has important implications for model dynamics,
however, debt-de￿ ation e⁄ect (generated by having debt contracts written in nominal
terms) is not the dominating e⁄ect for the dynamics of net worth. We ￿nd that variability
in in￿ ation under PT is less than under IT. This is because forward-looking agents will
adjust prices by to a lesser extent under PT since they expect the monetary authority
will o⁄set the current shocks in the future. Rational expectations become automatic
stabilizers in this forward-looking model. In fact, this expectation channel is so e⁄ective
and the variability in price level so low that the nominal interest rate is less volatile
under PT. As a result, variabilities in the real interest rate and output gap vary little
across the two regimes in our benchmark case.
In order to identify the role of ￿nancial market imperfections in the PT versus IT
comparison, we estimate two alternative models: one from which equity market frictions
have been removed and one from which frictions in both markets have been removed. As
compared against these two models, the data favor our benchmark model. We conduct
stochastic simulations based on these three di⁄erent models and we show that relative
to the models with ￿nancial market frictions, the model without ￿nancial market fric-
tions predicts larger reductions in loss function under PT. The intuition behind these
results is as follows: in a model where ￿nancial market frictions are absent, most of the
distortions come from ine¢ cient price dispersions caused by nominal rigidities. Thus
stabilizing in￿ ation implies a stabilization of the output gap, and PT is particularly
e⁄ective. However, in the presence of ￿nancial markets imperfections this is not nec-
essarily the case. The agency costs in the debt market and the equity issuance costs
in the equity market create additional distortions. Due to these distortions, stabilizing
in￿ ation does not necessarily lead to less variability in the output gap. The e⁄ectiveness
of PT depends on the shock structure. In particular, following an investment-speci￿c
shock, these additional distortions cause in￿ ation and the output gap to move in oppo-
site directions. In this case, the monetary authority faces a trade-o⁄between the output
5For evidence on the United States see work by Fama and French (2005), Jermann and Quadrini
(2006), Covas and den Haan (2006), and Levy and Hennessy (2006). For evidence on Canadian ￿rms,
see work by Covas and den Haan (2007).
3gap and in￿ ation: when monetary authority tries to bring down in￿ ation, the output
gap widens. Thus, if this type of shock is a signi￿cant source of volatility in economy, a
decrease in the volatility of in￿ ation might lead to smaller reduction (or even increase)
in the volatility of the output gap, thus reducing the e⁄ectiveness of PT.6
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the model
and in section 3, we discuss the data and estimation strategy. In section 4, we report
the estimation results and illustrate the main mechanisms of the model. In section 5, we




The representative household derives utility from consumption, Ct; real money balances,
Mt=Pt; and leisure, 1 ￿ Ht, with 0 < H < 1. The household owns equity in retailers
and supplies labor to entrepreneurs who produce the wholesale goods. The household





























where 1=￿ is the labor supply elasticity, and ￿ and ’ are the weights on leisure and real
money balance in the utility function. The variable et is an exogenous preference shock
which follows



















where Wt is the nominal wage that the household receives from the entrepreneurs, ￿t
is the real dividend from retailers, Tt is a lump-sum tax, Bt￿1 is the bond held between
periods t ￿ 1 and t, and Rn
t￿1 is the nominal rate of return on the riskless bond.
The household maximizes its expected lifetime utility equation (1) subject to equation














6Coletti et al. (2008) also ￿nds that PT versus IT comparison is sensitive to the incidence of di⁄erent










As in Bernanke et al. (1999) (herein, BGG) entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and manage















At the end of period t ￿ 1, entrepreneurs purchase capital K
j
t and use it in period t to
produce wholesale goods with labor L
j
t. Production is subject to two type of shocks:
!t is the idiosyncratic shock, which is private information to the entrepreneur and is
i.i.d across entrepreneurs and time, with mean E[!
j
t] = 1; zt is an exogenous technology
shock common to all the entrepreneurs which follows







Labor consists of both household labor H
j































where Wt and W e
t are respectively the nominal wages received by households and entre-
preneurs, and PW;t is the nominal price of wholesale goods.
Capital purchased at the end of period t, K
j
t+1, is partly ￿nanced from the entrepre-
neur￿ s net worth, N
j













where Qt is the price of capital relative to the aggregate price Pt. Note, unlike in BGG,
that the debt contract in this model is in nominal terms, that is, entrepreneurs sign a
debt contract that speci￿es a nominal interest rate, Rn
t .
The ￿nancial market imperfections are similar to those in BGG: because the idio-
syncratic shock !
j
t is private information for the borrowers (entrepreneurs), there exists
7As in Bernanke et al. (1999), each entrepreneur is endowed with He
t units of labor to ensure that
new entrepreneurs have some funds to start out.
5information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders (￿nancial intermediaries). Due
to costly state veri￿cation, lenders have to pay an auditing cost to observe the output. In
BGG the optimal contract is a standard debt with costly bankruptcy: if the entrepreneur
does not default, the lender receives a ￿xed payment independent of !
j
t but contingent
upon the aggregate state; if the entrepreneur defaults, the lender audits and seizes the
realized return (net of monitoring costs). The risk premium associated with external













t+1 is the expected rate of return of capital, which is equal to the expected
cost of external funds in equilibrium, and Et[Rn
t
Pt
Pt+1] is the cost of internal funds. BGG
shows that the optimal contract implies that the external ￿nance premium, s(:), depends
on the entrepreneur￿ s balance sheet position. In particular, the external ￿nance premium












0(:) > 0 and s(1) = 1.8 The supply curve for external ￿nancing or the expected












The expected gross return on capital from periods t to t + 1, EtRk
t+1, depends on the










The demand for capital depends on both the expected return on capital (equation
(16)) and the expected cost of external ￿nancing (equation (15)). To ensure that entre-
preneurs will never accumulate enough funds to ￿nance capital acquisitions entirely out
of net worth, following BGG, we assume that they have ￿nite lives. The probability that
an entrepreneur survives until the next period is ￿.







where ￿ > 0. In the steady-state, the external ￿nance premium is determined by equation 13.
6The aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs at the end of period t, Nt+1, is the sum of














Equation (17) suggests that the di⁄erence between the realized rate of return on capital
in period t, Rk
t, and the expected rate of return on capital in the previous period, Et￿1Rk
t,
is the main source of changes in the entrepreneurial net worth. Since entrepreneurs sign
a debt contract that speci￿es a nominal interest rate in our model, an unanticipated
change in in￿ ation will also a⁄ect the real cost of debt repayment, and, in turn, the
di⁄erence between Rk
t and Et￿1Rk





















which implies that an unexpected increase (decrease) in in￿ ation reduces (increases) the
real cost of debt repayment and, in turn, increase (decrease) net worth (debt-de￿ ation
e⁄ect).
Entrepreneurs going out of business will consume their residual equity,
C
e










t is the aggregate consumption of the entrepreneurs who exit in period t.
2.3 Capital producers
Capital production is assumed to be subject to an investment-speci￿c shock, xt. Capital
producers purchase the ￿nal goods from retailers as investment goods, It, and produce
e¢ cient investment goods, xtIt. E¢ cient investment goods are then combined with the
existing capital stock to produce new capital goods, Kt+1. The aggregate capital stock
evolves according to:
Kt+1 = xtIt + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt: (20)
The shock xt follows the ￿rst-order autoregressive process:







Capital producers are subject to equity issuance costs. Following Covas and den Haan




9Note that the wage income for entrepreneurs is quantitatively small.
7where
￿x < 0: (23)
This functional form has two features: (1). the cost of issuing equity is quadratic. (2).
equity issuance cost is countercyclical. Feature 1 is motivated by the empirical evidence
in Altinkili￿ and Hansen (2000) that underwriting fees display increasing marginal costs.
Feature 2 is used to capture the following consideration: one thing that makes equity
issuance costly is investors￿concern that a ￿rm has an incentive to issue equity when it
has private information that it is overvalued by the market. Choe et al. (1993) argues
that this concern is countercyclical.10




















and the ￿rst-order condition is
Et
￿










There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers of measure 1. Retailers
buy wholesale goods from entrepreneurs and di⁄erentiate them at zero cost. Let Yt(j)
be the retail good sold by retailer j and let Pt(j) be its nominal price. The ￿nal good,



























Following Calvo (1983), each retailer cannot reoptimize prices unless it receives a random
signal. The probability of receiving such a signal is 1 ￿ ￿. Thus, in each period, only a
fraction of 1 ￿ ￿ of retailers reset their prices, while the remaining retailers keep their
prices unchanged. Given the demand function equation (28), the retailer chooses Pjt to
10See more discussion in Covas and den Haan (2006)












where ￿t;i ￿ ￿
iCt+i=Ct is the stochastic discount factor and the real marginal cost, mct,
is the price of wholesale goods relative to the price of ￿nal goods (PW;t=Pt). Let P ￿
t be















The aggregate price evolves according to:
Pt = [￿P
1￿"






2.5 Aggregation and equilibrium
We assume that the newly created money is transferred to households, so that Tt =
Mt ￿ Mt￿1.




1￿￿ = Ct + C
e








Kt + ￿(It;xt): (32)
However, this restriction is not valid in this model. Price stickiness induces price dis-
persion across ￿nal goods, and this price dispersion is ine¢ cient and causes output loss.
Thus, when aggregating, we need to make some adjustment to take into account this
ine¢ ciency. To see this, consider the equilibrium condition at the ￿rm level:
F(Kjt;Ljt) = (Ct + C
e















when integrating over all ￿rms, we obtain
F(Kt;Lt) = (Ct + C
e
























dj. We can show that








11See Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2006) for details.
9Thus, the resource constraint in the model is given by
F(Kt;Lt) = (Ct + C
e








Kt + ￿(It;xt))￿t; (36)
where ￿t summarizes the resource costs induced by the relative price dispersion. Schmitt-
GrohØ and Uribe (2006) show that ￿t is bounded below by 1 and has ￿rst-order real
consequences for the stationary distribution of the endogenous variables if the steady-
state in￿ ation is positive.
2.6 Monetary policy rules
In￿ ation targeting. Under an in￿ ation targeting regime, we assume that the central
bank operates according to the standard Taylor Rule. The central bank adjusts the
nominal interest rate, Rn
t , in response to deviations of in￿ ation, ￿t, from its steady-state
value, ￿, and output, Yt, from its e¢ cient level, Y e
t , which is de￿ned as the level of output
that would prevail in the ￿ exible-price economy without ￿nancial market imperfections.12
We use the deviation from the e¢ cient output level rather than the steady-state level
for the following reasons: ￿rst, in the presence of technology shocks, the e¢ cient level
of output varies. It is natural to allow the central bank to recognize this fact when
adjusting nominal interest rates. Second, the e¢ cient output level tends to move in
the same direction as output. As a result, if the central bank takes deviation from the
steady-state output as an argument in its policy rule, it will tend to set policy that is
















where Rn and ￿ are the steady-state values of Rn
t and ￿t, and "m




t ￿ i:i:d:N(0;￿"m): (38)
￿￿ and ￿Y are policy coe¢ cients chosen by the central bank.
Price-level-path targeting. We assume that by targeting the price level, the central
bank adjusts the nominal interest rate, Rn
t , in response to deviations of the price level,















where Pt = ￿tP0, and P0 = 1:
12In such an economy, there is no price rigidity nor capital adjustment cost and the external risk
premium does not depend on leverage. However, we still assume that ￿rms have to pay risk premium
when they go to external ￿nanciers. Risk premium is ￿xed at its steady-state value.
103 Data and Estimation Strategy
We adopt a Bayesian approach to estimate the model. We use four series of quarterly
Canadian data: output, investment, nominal interest rate and in￿ ation. These series
correspond to the vector of observable variables of our model. The sample for our data set
spans from 1980Q1 to 2006Q4. Output is measured by real GDP excluding government
expenditures because there is no government spending in the model.13 Investment is
measured by the sum of business gross ￿xed capital formation and business investment
in inventories. The nominal interest rate is measured by the overnight rate. In￿ ation
is calculated from the core CPI.14 Data on output and investment are expressed in per
capita terms using the civilian population aged 15 and up. Both output and investment
series are linearly detrended before estimation. Since a constant in￿ ation target is not
plausible for the sample period of 1980Q1 to 2006Q4, we detrend the in￿ ation and
nominal interest rate data using the implicit in￿ ation target series from Amano and
Murchison (2000).
As is standard when taking DSGE models to the data, we set some parameters prior
to estimation because they cannot be identi￿ed from the data. The discount factor ￿ is
set at 0:99, which corresponds to an annual real interest rate in the steady-state at four
percent. The steady-state depreciation rate is set to 0:025, which implies an annual rate
of depreciation of ten percent. The parameter of the Cobb-Douglas function, ￿, is set to
1=3. The steady-state price mark up "=(" ￿ 1) is set to 1:1. We set ￿ = 0:8 so that the
implied labor supply elasticity is 1=￿ = 1:25. We set ￿ = 0:195 so that households spend
one third of their time working. The survival rate of entrepreneurs, ￿, is set to 0:9728,
which is taken from BGG; this implies that the average working life for entrepreneurs is
36 years. The steady-state in￿ ation rate is set to ￿ = 0:02 per year.
For the parameters that we estimate, the ￿rst column in Table 2 gives the density,
mean and standard deviation of the priors. The elasticity of the external ￿nance premium
with respect to ￿rm leverage is set to have a gamma distribution with mean 0:05, which
is close to the estimate in Christensen and Dib (2008), which uses maximum likelihood
procedure to estimate a sticky-price model with a ￿nancial accelerator on U.S. data.











where ￿0 is set to have a gamma distribution with mean 0:75 and standard deviation of
0.1 and the time-varying parameter, ￿1, is set to have a gamma distribution with mean
20 and standard deviation of 2. This implies that at the steady-state the average equity
issuance cost is around 5 percent and the standard deviation of equity issuance cost is
around 1 percent, which is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Covas and
den Haan (2006).
13We do not exclude net exports from the data since they are less than 1 percent of total GDP.
14The core CPI is the CPI excluding eight of the most volatile components as well as the e⁄ect of
changes in indirect taxes on the remaining components). The Bank of Canada uses the core CPI as the
basis for its policy actions.
11The rest of the priors are standard and follow the literature. For the monetary policy
rule, we set the prior of the reaction on in￿ ation, ￿￿, to have a gamma distribution with
mean 1.5 and standard deviation 0.1. The coe¢ cient of the reaction on output gap, ￿y,
is assumed to have a normal distribution of mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.02.15
For the priors of the shocks a⁄ecting the economy, we set the autoregressive coe¢ -
cients of the technology shocks, investment e¢ ciency shocks and preference shocks to
have a beta distribution with mean 0:80 and standard deviation 0.05. The standard
deviations of the innovations are assumed to follow an inverse-gamma distribution with
a mean of 0:01.
Finally, following the literature, the parameter ￿, which determines the degree of
capital adjustment costs, is set to have a normal distribution with mean 0:25 and stan-
dard deviation 0.05. The Calvo probability is assumed to be around 0.67, suggesting an
average length of price contract of three quarters.
We use Dynare 3.065 to estimate the model. We use the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm
to perform simulations. To check convergence, we run two di⁄erence chains starting from
dispersed points. For each chain, the total number of draws is 100;000 and the ￿rst 20
percent of the draws are neglected. A step size of 0:5 resulted in a rejection rate of 0:36.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Table 2 displays the mode, the mean, and the 5 and 95 percentiles of the posterior
distribution of the parameters. The prior and posterior distributions of all parameters
are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 3 displays the smoothed shocks. Overall, the
data seem to be very informative on the exogenous shock processes and the monetary
policy parameters. The data appear to be less informative on behavioral parameters,
especially ￿, the capital adjustment cost parameter, and ￿1, the parameter determining
the volatility of equity issuance costs.
In what follows, we report the posterior modes instead of means since they are very
close. The elasticity of the risk premium with respect to leverage, ￿, is estimated to be
around 4 percent. The estimated posterior mode of equity issuance cost parameters, ￿0
and ￿1, are 0:92 and 19:64 respectively. This implies that in the steady-state the average
equity issuance cost is around 5:2 percent and the standard deviation of the average
equity issuance cost is around 1 percent.
The estimated value of monetary policy parameters, ￿￿, the coe¢ cient which mea-
sures the response of monetary policy to deviation of in￿ ation, is 1:3. Given that we set
the interest rate smoothing parameter to 0, this value is quite reasonable. The coe¢ cient
that measures the response of monetary policy to output gap, ￿y, is 0:015. This suggests
that policy does not appear to react very strongly to output gap.
15As a robustness check, we also estimate the model with an interest rate smoothing parameter in
the monetary policy rule. There is no substantial di⁄erence for the main results of the paper.
12Turning to the estimates of the parameters for the exogenous shock processes, it turns
out that both the investment-speci￿c shock and preference shock are more persistent
(0.88 and 0.87, respectively) than the technology shock (0.76). The preference and
technology shocks are more volatile (0.0114 and 0.0147 respectively) than the investment-
speci￿c and monetary policy shocks (0.0057 and 0.0067).
Finally, we turn to the other two parameters, ￿ and ￿. The estimate of ￿, the capital
adjustment cost, is 0:26, which is lower than the estimated value in Christensen and Dib
(2008). This suggests that the frictions in the capital production market is partly being
captured by the equity issuance costs. The estimate of the sticky price parameter, ￿, is
0.42, suggesting that the average duration of price contracts is about two quarters.
4.2 Model comparison
To further access the impact of modeling explicitly the frictions in the debt market
and equity market, we estimate two alternative models: one model with debt market
frictions but no equity issuance costs, in which we set ￿0 = ￿1 = 0 (DF model, hereafter),
and, one model without frictions in either the debt or equity market, in which we set
equity issuance costs to be 0, turn o⁄ the ￿nancial accelerator by setting ￿ = 0, and
set the external risk premium at its steady-state level (NoFF model, hereafter). We
compare the log data densities obtained from these models with that of the benchmark
model with both debt and equity frictions (EDF model, hereafter). We also compare
the model-implied volatilities and correlations of key variables with the data.
Table 3 presents the estimates of the modes of the parameters and log data densities
for the three models. To facilitate the comparison across the three models, the ￿rst
column reproduces the estimates of the EDF model. Based on log data density, we
conclude that the data prefers the EDF model. Table 4 compares the standard deviations
and relative volatilities of key variables implied in each model against the data. Although
all of the three models generate higher relative volatilities in investment, nominal interest
rate and in￿ ation than is observed empirically, the results from the EDF model are closer
to the data. Table 5 reports correlations between variables from the data and for the
three models. The EDF model generates a correlation between nominal interest rate and
in￿ ation that is very close to the data, although it predicts lower correlations between
the other variables. The DF model generates higher values for all the correlations except
that between output and investment. The results for the NoFF model are similar to the
DF model except that it underpredicts the correlations between output and the nominal
interest rate and between output and in￿ ation.
4.3 Impulse responses
In order to examine the e⁄ect of the imperfections in the debt and equity markets on
model dynamics, we simulate the three economies EDF, DF and NoFF.16 Figures 4
16Since the data prefer the EDF model, the stochastic simulations in this section are based on the
estimates of the EDF model.
13through 7 show the impulse responses to one standard deviation of investment-speci￿c
shock, technology shock, preference shock and monetary policy shock. Each variable￿ s
response is expressed as a percentage deviation from its steady-state level. Because we
assume that monetary policy reacts to the deviation of output from the e¢ cient output
level, we plot responses in both output and the output gap.
Investment-e¢ ciency shock Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a one standard
deviation of investment-e¢ ciency shock. In response to the shock, ￿nal goods are now
turned into investment goods more e¢ ciently. As a result, investment increases and the
price of capital falls. Since households spend more resources on investment, consumption
decreases. To smooth ￿ uctuations in consumption households increase the supply of
labor. Thus hours increase and output rises. In￿ ation and nominal interest rate rise on
impact.
Responses in the DF Model are ￿dampened￿relative to the responses of the model
without ￿nancial market frictions (the NoFF Model). Output, investment and hours still
increase, but to a lesser degree. This is due to imperfections in the debt market. The
decrease in asset price drives down net worth, which causes the external risk premium to
rise. This dampens the response in investment, consumption, hours and output. Notice
that net worth falls despite an increase in in￿ ation. This indicates that the debt de￿ ation
e⁄ect is not dominant. Output falls below its potential due to the imperfections in the
￿nancial market.
In the model with both nominal debt and equity issuance costs (the EDF model),
although the dampening e⁄ect of the ￿nancial accelerator still exists, output, investment
and hours increases to a greater extent than in DF. This is due to the countercyclical
nature of equity issuance costs. After a positive investment-speci￿c shock, the issuance
cost per unit of equity decreases, and capital producers increase capital production in
response to this reduced cost. As a result, investment rises more and the asset price
decreases much more. Households need to reduce consumption even more in order to
increase investment spending. However, households are not willing to reduce consump-
tion too much, thus in order to smooth consumption, households increase labor supply,
which leads to an increase in output. Thus, on impact, we observe a positive output gap,
and the overall deviation of output from its e¢ cient level is less than in the DF model.
Technology shock Figure 5 presents the impulse responses to a one standard devi-
ation of a technology shock. In the model without ￿nancial market frictions, output,
investment, consumption and hours rise. Asset prices rise due to increased demand for
capital. Both in￿ ation and the nominal interest rate fall.
The DF Model shows that the ￿nancial accelerator dampens the responses of output,
investment and asset prices slightly. This is due to the rise in external risk premium.17
Net worth increases despite the fact that in￿ ation declines. This indicates again that
the debt-de￿ ation e⁄ect is not the e⁄ect dominating the dynamics of net worth. In the
model with equity issuance costs (the EDF model), there is more dampening in output
17Risk premium and net worth rise at the same time. This is because leverage rises.
14and investment. Capital producers need to ￿nance the increase in investment with
costly equity; this additional cost pushes up the asset price and dampens the response
in investment. In contrast to the investment-speci￿c shock, the issuance cost per unit
of equity has not changed. Overall, the distortions generated by the imperfections in
the debt market and equity issuance market force output below the potential level. The
distortions are more severe in the EDF model.
Preference shock The impulse responses to a one standard deviation of a preference
shock are plotted in Figure 6. Following the shock, the marginal utility of consumption
increases, which drives up the opportunity cost of savings. Households divert wealth
saved in deposits to consumption. The decline in savings leads the nominal interest rate
to increase and investment to fall. The increase in consumption leads households to
reduce leisure so hours worked increase. Output rises due to the increase in hours. Asset
prices decrease due to the fall in investment.
The impulse responses to a positive preference shock are almost identical in the DF
Model and the EDF model except for the response of asset prices.18 Compared to the
NoFF model, in both the DF Model and the EDF model, the presence of the ￿nancial
accelerator dampens the decline in investment due to the decline in the external risk
premium. However, the adjustment in investment is smoother in the model with equity
since the equity issuance costs increase with investment. This reduces the deviation of
output from its e¢ cient level.
Monetary policy shock Finally, ￿gure 7 plots the impulse responses to one standard
deviation of monetary policy shock. After a contractionary monetary policy shock, the
nominal interest rate rises. Output, investment, consumption, in￿ ation and the supply
of labor all fall on impact. The decrease in investment leads to a decline in the demand
for capital, which leads to a lower asset price. Although the ￿nancial accelerator has
a slight ampli￿cation e⁄ect, the responses in output, consumption and investment are
almost identical in the DF Model and the NoFF model. This is because the external risk
premium barely changes in the DF model.19 In the model with both debt and equity
frictions, net worth drops much more, leading to a higher risk premium. However, the
increase in risk premium is modest and the equity cost e⁄ect dominates the response of
investment. That is, investment declines less than in the DF model because the cost of
issuing equity decreases as investment falls. The declines in hours and output are also
dampened.
To summarize, we ￿nd that the ￿nancial accelerator ampli￿es and propagates the
e⁄ects of demand shocks (preference and monetary policy shocks) on investment and
output, but dampens those of the supply shocks (technology and investment-speci￿c
18Asset price tends to be more volatile in the model with equity issuance costs since it is more costly
to adjust in this model.
19Note that both net worth and asset price decrease in this case and these two e⁄ects largely cancel
each other out in their impact on the risk premium.
15shocks).20 These ￿ndings are similar to those in Christensen and Dib (2008) which also
study the role of the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism with a nominal debt contract.
However, regarding whether the dampening e⁄ect of the ￿nancial accelerator to the
supply shocks is caused by debt-de￿ ation e⁄ect, our model tells a di⁄erent story. In
Christensen and Dib (2008), after a positive technology shock, the decline in in￿ ation
increases the real cost of repaying existing debt, creating a debt-de￿ ation e⁄ect. This
debt-de￿ ation e⁄ect dominates and forces net worth down. In our model, net worth
increases. This is because after a positive technology shock, the rate of return on capital
increases so much that it dominates debt-de￿ ation e⁄ect and drives up net worth.
Overall, we show that the movement of the external risk premium is the driving
force determining whether the ￿nancial accelerator has a ampli￿cation or a dampening
e⁄ect. Following a positive supply shock, this ￿nancial accelerator mechanism leads to a
negative output gap due to the dampening e⁄ect. Following a positive demand shock, it
leads to a positive output gap due to the ampli￿cation e⁄ect.21 Equity issuance costs add
another distortion to capital production, making capital adjustment more costly to all
shocks except the investment-speci￿c shock. Following demand shocks, this additional
distortion dampens the response in investment, which helps to close the positive output
gap. For the remaining supply shocks, technology shock and investment-speci￿c shock,
the e⁄ects of this distortion are di⁄erent. Following a positive technology shock, this
additional distortion drives output further below the potential. However, following an
investment-speci￿c shock, the countercyclical feature of equity issuance costs mitigates
the dampening in investment. On impact we observe a positive output gap, and overall
deviation of output from the e¢ cient level is less than in the model with only debt
market frictions.
5 Price-level versus in￿ ation targeting
How would the real variables in the economy with ￿nancial market imperfections re-
spond to the shocks in a price-level path targeting regime? Can a price-level targeting
regime outperform the current in￿ ation targeting regime in an economy with ￿nancial
market imperfections? To answer these questions, in this section, we conduct stochastic
simulations comparing these two regimes.
5.1 PT versus IT with ￿nancial market imperfections: the
benchmark case
In the simulations, we assume that the only di⁄erence in the two economies is monetary
policy: in one case the central bank follows an in￿ ation targeting rule, while the other
follows a price-level path rule. The behavioral parameters and the parameters governing
20Notice the ampli￿cation e⁄ect of monetary policy shock is only marginal. There is no propagation
e⁄ect of monetary policy shock because we set interest rate smoothing parameter to 0.
21Note that Figure 7 represents a positive interest rate shock, which should be considered a negative
demand shock.
16the exogenous shocks do not vary between these two regimes; their values are taken from
Table 2.22 For the coe¢ cients in the in￿ ation targeting rule, ￿￿ and ￿y, we set them
to the estimates ￿￿ = 1:30 and ￿y = 0:015. We do not have much knowledge of the
values of the coe¢ cients in the price-level path rule. Instead of identifying an optimal
PT rule, which requires a utility-based welfare analysis, we provide a numerical example
that sheds some light on how e⁄ective PT is in reducing the variability in output gap and
in￿ ation given the distortions in ￿nancial markets. In this example, we set ￿p = 1:30 and
￿y = 0:015, take it as our benchmark. In the next section, we varies these parameters
to examine di⁄erent PT rules. To evaluate these two rules, in Table 6 we report the
standard deviations of key variables and the loss functions under the two rules, which





var(Y gap ￿ Y gapss) +
1
2
var(￿t ￿ ￿ss); (41)
where Y gap = Yt￿Y e
t and Y gapss = Yss￿Y e
ss. Since one of the natural questions arising
with a price-level targeting regime is how long it should take for price level to return
to target, we also report this horizon.24 We report the long-run forecast-error variance
decompositions for output gap, in￿ ation and nominal interest rate for both regimes in
Table 7.
Table 6 shows that compared to the economy under the IT rule, the economy under
the PT rule has much less variability in in￿ ation (36 percent of that under the IT rule)
and slightly less variability in output gap (98 percent of that under the IT rule). The
variability in price level under the PT rule is also very small, which explains the lower
variability in the nominal interest rate. Overall, this PT rule reduces loss by 21 percent,
and brings the price level back to target in 4 years.
Thus, for the benchmark case, PT can be a free lunch: in￿ ation variability is not only
reduced in the long-run but also in the short-run. This con￿rms the new view that in a
forward-looking model, under PT in￿ ation expectations operate as automatic stabilizers.
Forward-looking agents understand that the central bank will o⁄set disturbances to the
price level and take this into account when they set today￿ s prices, thus it is optimal for
them to change prices by less. This also explains why real shocks (technology, investment
22The parameters of the model might not be invariant to the monetary policy rule. However, it is
not obvious which of the parameters are likely to change and in which direction. Regarding uncertainty
and monetary policy, see interesting discussions in Dib et al. (2008)
23The loss function can be represented in a more general form, L = var(\ Y gapt)+￿var(￿t ￿￿ss) with
0 < ￿ < 1. We consider this equal weight loss function as the upper bound. The results of the PT-IT
comparison can vary if we rank rules based welfare considerations rather than loss functions.
24Horizon is de￿ned and computed in the following way. First, we plot the impulse response functions
of the price level for each shock and compute the number of periods that it takes for the price level to
return to the steady state. More speci￿cally, we use the " 90 percent rule" to determine whether the
steady-state has been reached. That is, once the price level recovers 90 percent from the peak of the
deviation, we suppose that it has come back to the steady-state. Then we weigh each of the responses
to come up with an aggregate response. For the weights, we use the contributions of the shocks to the
variability of price level and normalize them to 1. Note that another way of computing horizon is to
use the stochastic simulation method of Basant Roi and Mendes (2007)
17and preference shocks) contribute little to variability in in￿ ation and nominal interest
rate under the PT rule.
However, given that there is not much stickiness in this economy (the estimated Calvo
parameter is only 0:42) and that debt-de￿ ation e⁄ect is not the dominating e⁄ect for the
dynamics of net worth, the reduction in in￿ ation variability has little impact on output
gap variability. In fact, the changes in the nominal interest rate and in￿ ation cancel
out each other and leave the variability of real interest rate barely changed between the
two regimes. The variance decompositions of output gap under the two regimes are also
quite similar.
5.2 The role of ￿nancial market imperfections in PT versus IT
comparison
Simulation results based on the benchmark model suggest that frictions in the debt and
the equity markets have important e⁄ects on the dynamics of the model. Thus, policy
recommendations based on di⁄erent models (modeling frictions explicitly or ignoring
the frictions) can potentially be di⁄erent. In order to examine the policy question,
we conduct the following experiments in this section: ￿rst, we compute variability in
in￿ ation and output gap for the EDF, DF and NoFF economies using the parameter
values and monetary policy rules estimated separately for each economy in sections 4.1
and 4.2. Then, we assume that the three economies are subject to the same PT rule. We
conduct stochastic simulations under di⁄erent combinations of the parameters ￿y and
￿p.
Tables 8 through 10 present the standard deviation of output gap and in￿ ation, loss
functions and horizons. Note that the standard deviations and loss are normalized with
respect to their values in the corresponding IT cases. In what follows, we compare the
results in the three tables.
We ￿rst focus on the common pattern. We observe in all the three models when the
monetary authority responds to output gap very weakly, there is no trade-o⁄ between
variability in output gap and in￿ ation. That is, given low ￿y, when the monetary au-
thority responds more aggressively to price-level, both in￿ ation and output gap becomes
less volatile. However, when the monetary authority responds to output gap very aggres-
sively (￿y=1 and ￿y=5), a trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and output gap starts to appear.
Notice that horizon becomes substantivally longer in these cases since the monetary au-
thority puts more weight on stabilizing output gap relative to price level.25 PT delivers
lower variability in in￿ ation and smaller loss for most of the cases.
We now turn to the di⁄erences. The simulation results suggest that in general given
the same PT rule, compared to the model EDF, the model ignoring both debt market
imperfections and equity market imperfections predicts greater reductions in both vari-
ability in output gap and in￿ ation, while the model ignoring equity issuance frictions
25Smets (2003) suggests that the optimal policy horizon for maintaining a price level objective is
generally longer than that for achieving an in￿ ation objective. In his benchmark case the optimal policy
horizon under PT is 8 years.
18predicts lower reductions in both. Both the DF model and the NoFF model predict
shorter horizons.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. In the NoFF model, most of the
distortions come from the nominal rigidity in prices, that is, most of the variability in
output gap is caused by ine¢ cient price dispersion. In this model, reduction of in￿ ation
variability would automatically reduce output gap variability, so PT is most e⁄ective. In
the models with ￿nancial market imperfections, the agency costs in the debt market and
the equity issuance costs in the equity market create additional distortions. Due to the
existence of these real frictions, reducing in￿ ation variability does not necessarily lead to
less variability in the output gap. The e⁄ectiveness of PT depends on the shock structure.
For the shocks that drive in￿ ation and output gap in the same direction, a monetary pol-
icy aimed at stabilizing in￿ ation can still stabilize output gap. However, for the shocks
that lead in￿ ation and output gap to move in the opposite directions, the monetary
authority faces a trade-o⁄ between output gap and in￿ ation: when monetary author-
ity tries to bring down in￿ ation, the output gap widens. A positive investment-speci￿c
shock is an example of the latter type. Following a positive investment-speci￿c shock, in
the DF model, we observe a negative output gap and a rise in in￿ ation. Frictions in the
debt market prevent investment from rising as much as in the NoFF model, which causes
output to fall below the potential. In the EDF model, following an investment-speci￿c
shock, the countercyclical feature of equity issuance costs mitigates the distortions gen-
erated in the debt market, and therefore output deviates from the e¢ cient level to a
lesser extent than in the DF model. Thus PT is more e⁄ective in the EDF model. These
results suggest that the conclusions regarding the advantages of the PT regime versus
the IT regime are dependent on the type of frictions/shocks being considered.
6 Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to compare the performance of two monetary policy
regimes￿ price-level-path targeting and in￿ ation targeting￿ in a standard New Key-
nesian model augmented with ￿nancial market imperfections. We ￿nd that introducing
￿nancial market imperfections brings new and important insights to the evaluation of
these two monetary policy regimes.
Speci￿cally, the contributions of the paper are as follows: ￿rst, we show that modeling
￿nancial market frictions, especially equity market frictions, enhances the model￿ s ￿t to
Canadian data, and that ￿nancial market frictions have important implications for model
dynamics. Second, compared to the current IT regime, we show that PT can be a free
lunch￿ that is, in￿ ation variability is reduced not only in the long-run but also in the
short-run. Third, we show that PT is most e⁄ective in reducing the distortions caused
by nominal rigidities. Fourth, we show that given the existence of ￿nancial market
frictions, the model ignoring those frictions can give misleading predictions regarding
the gains (or the losses) arising from a switch to PT
There are several directions in which this paper could be extended. First, to better
19evaluate the performance of PT versus IT, a utility-based welfare analysis will be nec-
essary. Second, given that we focus on the Canadian economy, a small open economy
model could potentially ￿t the data better.26 Third, the fact that the debt-de￿ ation
e⁄ect is not signi￿cant may be due to the nominal debt contract only lasting one-period
in our model. With longer contracts, we expect that di⁄erent implications for the PT-IT
comparison could emerge.
26A very recent paper by Dib et al. (2008) explores the desirability of price-level path targeting in a
multi-sector small open economy with nominal debt contracts in both the domestic and international
credit markets. Their policy implications are based on social welfare evaluations. However, equity
market frictions are not modeled in their paper and the paper focuses on the role of ￿nancial shocks in
the PT versus IT comparison rather than the role of ￿nancial market imperfections.
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22Table 1: Parameter Calibration
Parameters De￿nition Values
￿ discount factor 0.99
￿ capital depreciation rate 0.025
￿ capital share in production function 1/3
" intermediate-good elasticity of substitution 11
￿ inverse of labor supply elasticity 0.8
￿ weight on leisure in the utility function 0.195
￿ survival rate of entrepreneurs 0.9728
￿ gross steady-state in￿ ation rate 1.005
n=k steady-state ratio of net worth to capital 0.6
s gross steady-state risk premium 1.0177
23Table 2: Estimation Results
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Coef. Density Mean Std Mode Mean 5 percent 95 percent
￿ G 0.05 0.01 0.042 0.043 0.029 0.058
￿0 G 0.75 0.10 0.92 0.93 0.76 1.11
￿1 G 20.0 2.0 19.64 19.78 16.49 22.93
￿ N 0.25 0.05 0.26 0.26 0.18 0.34
￿ B 0.67 0.05 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.48
￿￿ G 1.50 0.10 1.30 1.33 1.22 1.43
￿Y N 0.10 0.02 0.015 0.009 -0.022 0.044
￿z B 0.80 0.05 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.82
￿x B 0.80 0.05 0.88 0.87 0.83 0.92
￿p B 0.80 0.05 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.91
￿z IG 0.01 ￿ 0.0114 0.0117 0.0101 0.0134
￿e IG 0.01 ￿ 0.0067 0.0068 0.0061 0.0076
￿x IG 0.01 ￿ 0.0057 0.0060 0.0045 0.0075
￿p IG 0.01 ￿ 0.0147 0.0150 0.0132 0.0170
24Table 3: Model Comparison: Likelihood
Prior Posterior Mode
Coef. Density Mean Std EDF DF NoFF
￿ G 0.05 0.01 0.042 0.065 ￿
￿0 G 0.75 0.10 0.92 ￿ ￿
￿1 G 20.0 2.0 19.64 ￿ ￿
￿ N 0.25 0.05 0.26 0.31 0.32
￿ B 0.67 0.05 0.42 0.34 0.34
￿￿ G 1.50 0.10 1.30 1.24 1.13
￿Y N 0.10 0.02 0.015 0.032 0.065
￿z B 0.80 0.05 0.76 0.80 0.84
￿x B 0.80 0.05 0.88 0.89 0.91
￿p B 0.80 0.05 0.87 0.88 0.90
￿z IG 0.01 ￿ 0.0114 0.0097 0.0095
￿e IG 0.01 ￿ 0.0067 0.0070 0.0072
￿x IG 0.01 ￿ 0.0057 0.0125 0.0076
￿p IG 0.01 ￿ 0.0147 0.0145 0.0131
log data density 1292.77 1255.78 1247.02
25Table 4: SDs and Relative Volatilities: Data and Models
Data EDF DF NoFF
Standard deviations
Output 0.040 0.030 0.033 0.036
Investment 0.134 0.121 0.150 0.177
Nominal interest rate 0.0086 0.0071 0.0082 0.0100
In￿ ation 0.0047 0.0061 0.0083 0.0100
Output gap ￿ 0.0119 0.0196 0.0079
Relative volatilities
Output 1 1 1 1
Investment 3.25 4.03 4.55 4.92
Nominal interest rate 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.28
In￿ ation 0.12 0.20 0.25 0.28
26Table 5: Correlations: Data and Models
Data EDF DF NoFF
Correlations
Output, investment 0.82 0.70 0.74 0.73
Output, nom. int. rate 0.29 0.13 0.37 0.20
Output, in￿ ation 0.39 0.31 0.48 0.33
Investment, nominal interest rate 0.32 0.20 0.45 0.42
Investment, in￿ ation 0.44 0.40 0.61 0.56
Nominal interest rate, in￿ ation 0.61 0.62 0.75 0.82
27Table 6: PT versus IT: Benchmark
In￿ ation targeting Price-level targeting PT relative to IT
Loss function 0.000179 0.000142 0.79
Horizon (in years) ￿ 4.0 ￿
Standard deviations of key variables
Output gap 0.0119 0.0117 0.98
In￿ ation 0.0061 0.0022 0.36
Price level ￿ 0.0023 ￿
Nominal interest rate 0.0074 0.0051 0.69
Real int. rate 0.0037 0.0042 1.14
28Table 7: Long-run Forecast Error Variance Decompositions: Benchmark
In￿ ation Targeting
Variable Technology Mon Policy Investment Preference
Output gap 29.1 30.2 25.7 15.1
In￿ ation 18.8 27.7 33.7 19.8
Nominal interest rate 23.5 11.8 40.4 24.3
Price-level-path Targeting
Variable Technology Mon Policy Investment Preference
Output gap 29.4 26.6 28.7 15.4
In￿ ation 3.3 87.6 7.4 1.6
Nominal interest rate 5.0 82.4 8.5 4.2
29Table 8: Simulation Results on PT: the EDF Model
Standard Deviation of Output Gap
￿y = 0:00 ￿y = 0:015 ￿y = 0:032 ￿y = 0:065 ￿y = 1:0 ￿y = 5:0
￿p = 1 1.018 1.010 1.002 0.986 0.805 0.721
￿p = 2 0.952 0.947 0.942 0.934 0.815 0.744
￿p = 5 0.885 0.884 0.882 0.879 0.823 0.768
Standard Deviation of In￿ ation
￿p = 1 0.401 0.394 0.387 0.374 0.319 0.705
￿p = 2 0.303 0.299 0.294 0.286 0.237 0.502
￿p = 5 0.186 0.184 0.182 0.179 0.151 0.312
Loss Function
￿p = 1 0.854 0.841 0.826 0.799 0.535 0.516
￿p = 2 0.736 0.729 0.721 0.707 0.538 0.490
￿p = 5 0.628 0.626 0.623 0.618 0.541 0.487
Horizon (in Years)
￿p = 1 4.6 4.4 4.2 10.2 35.6 37.4
￿p = 2 3.4 3.2 3.1 6.8 34.2 36.3
￿p = 5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 31.7 34.9
The corresponding IT case is ￿￿ = 1:3 and ￿y = 0:015
30Table 9: Simulation Results on PT: the DF Model
Standard Deviation of Output Gap
￿y = 0:00 ￿y = 0:015 ￿y = 0:032 ￿y = 0:065 ￿y = 1:0 ￿y = 5:0
￿p = 1 1.072 1.066 1.058 1.045 0.908 0.791
￿p = 2 1.027 1.024 1.021 1.014 0.935 0.848
￿p = 5 0.995 0.994 0.993 0.991 0.958 0.902
Standard Deviation of In￿ ation
￿p = 1 0.514 0.506 0.498 0.485 0.609 1.638
￿p = 2 0.358 0.353 0.348 0.339 0.373 0.996
￿p = 5 0.189 0.188 0.186 0.184 0.194 0.502
Loss Function
￿p = 1 1.015 1.002 0.987 0.962 0.755 0.939
￿p = 2 0.914 0.908 0.902 0.889 0.762 0.761
￿p = 5 0.845 0.843 0.841 0.838 0.784 0.729
Horizon (in Years)
￿p = 1 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.8 14.1 15.8
￿p = 2 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.2 13.7 15.1
￿p = 5 1.6 1.5 1.34 1.5 13.2 14.8
The corresponding IT case is ￿￿ = 1:24 and ￿y = 0:032
31Table 10: Simulation Results on PT: the NoFF Model
Standard Deviation of Output Gap
￿y = 0:00 ￿y = 0:015 ￿y = 0:032 ￿y = 0:065 ￿y = 1:0 ￿y = 5:0
￿p = 1 1.240 1.211 1.179 1.122 0.474 0.148
￿p = 2 0.884 0.867 0.850 0.818 0.406 0.150
￿p = 5 0.490 0.485 0.479 0.469 0.303 0.152
Standard Deviation of In￿ ation
￿p = 1 0.428 0.419 0.411 0.394 0.202 0.143
￿p = 2 0.300 0.296 0.290 0.281 0.157 0.106
￿p = 5 0.160 0.159 0.157 0.154 0.103 0.068
Loss Function
￿p = 1 0.704 0.672 0.638 0.579 0.111 0.021
￿p = 2 0.356 0.343 0.329 0.306 0.078 0.016
￿p = 5 0.108 0.106 0.104 0.099 0.042 0.012
Horizon (in Years)
￿p = 1 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.1 9.1 13.9
￿p = 2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.9 7.2 12.8
￿p = 5 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 5.0 11.5
The corresponding IT case is ￿￿ = 1:13 and ￿y = 0:065
32Figure 1: Prior and Posterior distribution of the model.






       
       
sigma_z
































































































34Figure 3: Smoothed shocks.































35Figure 4: Responses to a Positive Investment-Speci￿c Shock.































































































































36Figure 5: Responses to a Positive Technology Shock


































































































































37Figure 6: Responses to a Positive Preference Shock

































































































































38Figure 7: Responses to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
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